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Abstract
This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous
good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the
real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in this same space. When buying
from one of the firms, consumers incur the fixed price plus some transportation costs, which are
increasing with their distance to the firm. Under the assumption that each consumer is ready
to buy one unit of the good whatever the locations of the firms, firms converge to the median
location: there is “minimal differentiation”. In this article, we relax this assumption and assume
that there is an upper limit to the distance a consumer is ready to cover to buy the good. We
show that the game always has at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategy. Under this
more general assumption, the “minimal differentiation principle” no longer holds in general. At
equilibrium, firms choose “minimal”, “intermediate” or “full” differentiation, depending on this
critical distance a consumer is ready to cover and on the shape of the distribution of consumers’
locations.
Keywords: Spatial competition games, horizontal differentiation, willingness to pay
1 Introduction
The choice of product characteristics - and strategic product differentiation in particular - is a
central issue in Industrial Organization.
A large number of studies on this topic build on Hotelling’s seminal model of firm location
(Hotelling [1929]). In Hotelling’s model, consumers are uniformly distributed on a line. Two firms
selling an homogeneous good simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose a location on this line
(stage 1). Once locations are observed, firms simultaneously choose a price at which they sell the
good (stage 2). Consumers are ready to buy exactly one unit of the good (whatever the prices and
the locations). They incur linear transportation costs when traveling on the line to purchase the
good. Hotelling claims that this two-stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, where both firms
choose the same location at stage 1 - hence the name of “minimal differentiation principle” given
to Hotelling’s result.
Note that the game is framed here in geographical terms, but there is an immediate analogy
with a situation where firms, instead of a geographical location, choose some characteristics of
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their products in some space product à la Lancaster, and consumers differ in their preferences for
product characteristics. In this interpretation, the counter-part of the transportation cost is the
utility loss suffered by a consumer who consumes a product whose characteristics do not exactly
match her preferred ones. In the paper, we will use the geography terminology, and talk about
firms’ “positions” or “locations”, but all the results can also be equally interpreted in terms of more
general product characteristics.
d’Aspremont et al. [1979] challenge Hotelling’s convergence result, demonstrating that there is
a flaw in the resolution of the price subgame stage: the price subgame has no equilibrium in pure
strategies when firms are too close one from this other. Assuming that consumers have quadratic
transportation costs (instead of linear as in the original article), they show that the price subgame
always has a pure strategy equilibrium. They show that in that case, a “maximum differentiation”
principle holds, firms locating at the two ends of the line. The powerful intuition behind this
result is that firms differentiate to avoid too fierce a price competition at the second stage.1 As
summarized by Downs [1957], this two-stage model where firms first choose product characteristics
and then choose prices offers the standard explanation in industrial organization as to why “(...)
firms generally do not want to locate at the same place in the product space. The reason is simply the
Bertrand paradox: Two firms producing perfect substitutes face unbridled price competition (at least
in a static framework). In contrast, product differentiation establishes clienteles (“market niches”,
in the business terminology) and allows firms to enjoy some market power over these clienteles.
Thus, firms usually wish to differentiate themselves from other firms” (Downs [1957], page 278).2
In the present paper, Hotelling’s convergence result is also challenged, but on completely dif-
ferent grounds. We argue that softening the price competition is not the only force which may
drive firms apart. We do so by relaxing Hotelling’s assumption that the market is always covered,
whatever the locations and prices of the firms. Instead of assuming perfectly inelastic demand, we
assume unit demand funtions: a consumer buys the good only if her valuation for the good is higher
than the total cost, where the total cost is the price of the good augmented by the transporation
cost. If for both firms, the total cost is lower than her valuation, the consumer buys from the
firm with the lowest total cost (and randomizes equally between the two firms in case of equality).
Under this more general assumption, if both firms are too far away from her location, a consumer
might prefer not to buy the good. We will show that introducing this option to abstain/stay out
of the market, can be a powerful force in favor of differentiation.
In order to make this argument as transparent as possible, we study a one-stage location game,
where firms are assumed to sell the good at some pre-determined fixed price. This will allow us to
clearly distinguish our effect from the one driven by the price competition.
Note that this fixed-price situation is interesting per se, since there are many situations where,
for legal or technical reasons, price is not a free parameter in the competition. As noted by Downs
[1957], “There may exist legal or technical reasons why the scope of price competition is limited. For
instance, the prices of airline tickets in the United States (before deregulation) where determined
exogenously, as the price of gas and books in France once were” (page 287). Some shops sell products
whose price is exogenously determined, for instance newsstands, pharmacies, or franchises of brand
1See also Economides [1986], Osborne and Pitchik [1987] and Bester et al. [1996] for further discussion on
Hotelling’s result.
2A few papers have also analyzed how uncertainty about demand impacts this incentive to differente, such as
De Palma et al. [1985] and Meagher and Zauner [2004].
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clothes for example.3
In this fixed-price spatial competition, if the demand is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, both
firms choose the “median consumer” location, i.e. the location such that one half of the consumers
lay on its left-hand side, and the other half lay on its right-hand side. This results holds whatever
the form of the transportation costs and the distribution of consumers.4 The intuition behind this
convergence result is quite powerful. Consider any situation where the firms choose different loca-
tions. Then both firms could increase their profit by moving closer to their opponent. Indeed, with
such a move, each firm would win additional consumers (among those initially located between the
two firms), without losing any consumers on the other side. This shows that at any equilibrium in
pure strategies, the firms should converge.5
If instead there exists a maximum distance that consumers are ready to travel to buy the good,
we show that the convergence result may not hold anymore. One may observe some “interme-
diate” or even “full differentiation”. To be more precise about what we mean by partial or full
differentiation, we define the “potential attraction zone” of a firm as the set of consumers who
prefer buying from this firm rather than not buying the good at all. We say that there is “partial
differentiation” when firms choose different locations but their potential attraction zones intersect;
and that there is “full differentiation” when the two potential attraction zones do not intersect (or
intersect over of set of consumers of measure 0). We characterize all pure strategy equilibria, and
discuss their properties under quite general assumptions about the transportation cost functions
and the distribution of consumers. Assuming mild assumptions on the distribution of consumers6,
our results are the following. If the maximum traveling distance is high enough, both firms converge
to the median/modal location7 (the standard convergence result). Now, if this distance is small
enough, firms diverge at equilibrium. To understand the main intuition behind this result, suppose
that a firm has chosen the median/modal position. In that case, if its opponent also selects this
central position, the two firms will have exactly the same potential attraction zones, and thus each
3In the survey by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) of the early literature on spatial competition, Section 4 (pages
298-302) is devoted to this fixed-price situation.
4This result has been known in political economy under the name of “Median Voter theorem”(see Black [1948],
Tirole [1988]). In this interpretation, two political parties compete to attract voters, who are located along an
“ideological”left-right axis. If parties seek to attract as many voters as possible, they will at equilibrium both choose
the median location. Note that this analogy was already noted by Hotelling in his seminal article, where he writes:
“So general is this [agglomerative] tendency that it appears in the most diverse fields of competitive activity, even quite
apart from what is called economic life. In politics it is strikingly exemplified. The competition for votes between the
Republican and Democratic parties does not lead to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two strongly contrasted
positions between which the voter may choose. Instead, each party strives to make its platform as much like the
other’s as possible.”(page 54)
5Note that the result crucially depends on the duopoly assumption: with more than two firms, the situation in
which all firms converge at the median is no longer an equilibrium. Indeed, consider a pure location game with
n ≥ 2 firms. If all firms locate at the median, each gets a share 1/n of the consumers. By moving slightly to left or
the right, a deviating firm could attract almost 1/2 of the consumers. This simple argument shows that convergence
of all firms at the median cannot be an equilibrium at soon at n ≥ 3. In such a game, it has been shown that an
equilibrium in pure strategy exists only under very restricted assumptions about the distribution of consumers, and
when it does, firsm do not all converge, see for example Eaton and Lipsey [1975] and Fournier [2019] . Peters et al.
[2018] study a pure location model with congestion where consumers are uniformly distributed and each consumer
selects one of the firms based on distances as well as the number of consumers visiting each firm. They provide
conditions for the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and show that firms do not converge when the
number of firms is larger than two.
6We assume that the distribution is single-peaked, symmetric and that it has a continuous log-concave density.
Most standard distributions satisfy these assumptions.
7Since we assume that f is single-peaked and symmetric, the median and modal location coincide.
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will attract one half of the consumers who are located within acceptable distance of the central
position. The latter firm may fare better in that case by avoiding this frontal competition, and
moving somewhat to the left or the right. In doing so, it might win new consumers located “at
the periphery”, although it will come at the cost of losing some “central” consumers. We expect
the incentives to move away to be greater when the distribution is flatter (less concentration at
the modal position) and when the width of the attraction zone is larger. It will be shown to be
indeed the case. Depending of the width of the attraction zone compared to some indicator of the
flatness of the distribution of consumers’ location, we can observe full convergence to the central
position, intermediate differentiation, or complete differentiation (in the sense that no consumer is
located at equilibrium within acceptable distance of both firms). In particular, some necessary and
sufficient conditions on this ratio are provided for the convergence result to hold.
We are not the first to revisit Hotelling’s assumption of perfectly inelastic demand. Early
contributions by Lerner and Singer [1937] and Smithies [1941] note the centrifugal forces that a more
elastic demand may generate. Economides [1984] study a two-stage location-then-price Hotelling
game where consumers have a finite valuation for the good. In that case, even with linear costs of
transportation, a price equilibrium may exist at the second stage, and in the first stage, firms may
differentiate.8 Imperfectly inelastic demand in a pure location game has been studied by Feldman
et al. [2016] and Shen and Wang [2017], who consider a model where each seller has an interval of
attraction, as it is the case in our model, but they suppose that consumers randomly select where
to buy among attractive sellers. Contrary to our assumption, buyers do not necessarily buy from
the closest place. Feldman et al. [2016] study the case of uniformly distributed consumers; whereas
Shen and Wang [2017] study more general distributions. They prove the existence of pure Nash
equilibrium, but do not describe it. In the political science literature (see Footnote 4 for the analogy
between a fixed-price location game between firms and an electoral competition game between
parties), Tirole [1988], Hinich and Ordeshook [1970] or more recently Xefteris et al. [2017] have
also noted that if voters prefer to abstain when neither party is close enough to their ideal policy,
differentiation may result at equilibrium. Xefteris et al. [2017] study a more general abstention
function, and show that the game admits an equilibrium in mixed strategies (existence result).
They characterize equilibria in pure strategies only under the assumption that voters are uniformly
distributed and for a special case of the abstention function. Hinich and Ordeshook [1970] mostly
focus on the comparison of parties’ objectives: plurality maximization versus vote maximization.
In the latter case, which is the one we study in this paper, they show that differentiation can occur
in equilibria. We provide a more complete characterization of all equilibria.9
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in more detail in section 2. Section
3 characterizes all Nash equilibria in which firms play pure strategies. Section 4 comments the
results and discusses some of the assumptions. Section 5 contains the proofs.
2 The model
We study a (fixed-price) spatial competition game between two firms facing consumers with unit
demand functions.
8However, because a price equilibrium does not exist for every pair of locations, a complete analysis of the spatial
competition is impossible. The paper focuses on local firms’ deviations.
9In particular, because in their paper they mostly focus on first order conditions, they fail to notice that a
continnum of asymmetric equilibra may exist under some configurations of the parameters, and that first order
conditions are not necessarily sufficient.
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• The two firms (i = 1, 2) produce the same homogeneous good. Firm i ∈ {1, 2} produces
quantity q at cost γi(q). Firms sell the good at some identical pre-determined fixed price
p > 0. Before selling the good, they simultaneously select locations x1 and x2 on the real line
R.
• A mass 1 of potential consumers is distributed on X = R according to a probability distri-
bution that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We denote f its
density, and F its cumulative distribution. We focus our analysis on the set D of distributions
that have continuous log-concave densities (i.e. such that f can be written f(x) = eg(x) where
g is a concave function), and such that f is symmetric around 0 and strictly decreasing on R+.
The analysis would be identical if the distribution was symmetric around a mode different
from 0. The above hypotheses describe a very large class D of distributions that contains
for example the normal (centered) distributions, the Laplace distributions, the symmetric
exponential distributions, the logistic distributions, the symmetric gamma distributions, the
symmetric extreme value distributions, etc.10
• All consumers have the same valuation for the good v > 0. They also incur transportation
costs: they have a utility loss of traveling a distance d ≥ 0 that is denoted c(d). We suppose
that c (0) = 0 and that c is strictly increasing and continuous. If a consumer travels a distance
d to buy the good at the pre-determined price p, she gets the total utility:
u = v − p− c(d).
If she doesn’t buy the good, her utility is normalized to 0. Assuming that v − p > 0, u is
positive whenever the distance d is smaller than δ, where:
δ :=
{
c−1(v − p) > 0 if v − p ≤ lim
d→∞
c(d),
+∞ otherwise. (1)
Parameter δ > 0 denotes the maximal distance that a consumer is ready to travel to buy
the good. It is strictly increasing in the valuation of the good (v) and decreasing in its price
(p). Under these assumptions, a consumer buys from the closest firm if her distance to the
firm is smaller than δ (randomly choosing a firm if both firms are equidistant from her own
position), and she doesn’t buy otherwise.
• We assume that firms serve all the demand they face at price p, and that they maximize
their profit. When a quantity q of consumers buy from firm i, it makes a profit equal to
p× q− γi(q). We assume γ′i ≥ 0, γ′′i ≥ 0 and γ′i(1) < p, which imply that this profit function
is strictly increasing with respect to q. Under these assumptions, maximizing its profit is
equivalent for the firm to maximizing the quantity it sells.
• We can now formally define the 2-player game H(f, δ) associated to distribution f and pa-
rameter δ. The firms simultaneously select locations x1 and x2 in R. We denote by qi(x1, x2)
the quantity of consumers who buy from firm i when players choose locations x1 and x2 ∈ R.
Since for a firm, maximizing its profit is equivalent to maximizing the quantity of consumers
who buy from this firm, we define the payoff of firm i as being qi(x1, x2). Given our assump-
10In Section 4.3, we also study the case of a uniform distribution of consumers.
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tions about consumer behavior, the payoffs of the players are defined by:
qi(x1, x2) :=

∫
{t : {|xi−t|≤δ and |xi−t|=min{|x1−t|,|x2−t|} }
f(t)dt if x1 6= x2,
1
2
∫
{t : |xi−t|≤δ}
f(t)dt if x1 = x2.
We now introduce a number of definitions that will be useful to present our main results.
Definition “Potential attraction zones” : We call potential attraction zone of a firm the
set of locations such that consumers at these locations prefer buying from this firm rather than
not buying the good at all. Formally, the potential attraction zone of firm i when locations are
(x1, x2), denoted by Ai(x1, x2), is Ai(x1, x2) := {t : |xi − t| ≤ δ}.
Definition “No differentiation”/ “Full convergence ” : We say that at profile of locations
(x1, x2), there is no differentiation (or full convergence) if the potential attraction zones of the two
firms exactly coincide. Formally, this is the case if A1(x1, x2) = A2(x1, x2). Note that this happens
if and only if x1 = x2.
Definition “Partial differentiation ” : We say that at profile of locations (x1, x2), there is
partial differentiation if the potential attraction zones of the two firms partially overlap. Formally,
this means that the following two conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (i) the two potential
attraction zones A1(x1, x2) and A2(x1, x2) intersect over a set of consumers of positive measure,
(ii) x1 6= x2.
Definition “Full differentiation” : We say that at profile of locations (x1, x2), there is full
differentiation if the potential attraction zones of the two firms do not intersect, or intersect over
a set of consumers of measure 0.
Note that if δ = +∞, then for any distribution in D we have that (0, 0) is the unique equilibrium
(Median Voter theorem). In the following we focus on the case where δ ∈]0,+∞[.
In the next section, we characterize all Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the games H(f, δ)
for δ ∈]0,+∞[ and f ∈ D.
3 Equilibria
In this section, we characterize all Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the games H(f, δ). We will
show that for any δ ∈]0,+∞[ and f ∈ D, the game H(f, δ) always has at least one equilibrium
in pure strategy.11 We present these equilibria according to the level of differentiation they entail.
The main results of the paper are Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, which show
that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists, and characterize the set of equilibria. They deal
respectively with equilibria inducing no, partial and full differentiation.
11We know from Xefteris et al. [2017](Proposition 1) that the game admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium (possibly)
in mixed strategies.
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We will show that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of these different
types of equilibria only depend on parameter δ (the maximum distance a consumer is ready to travel
to buy the good) and on a parameter κ that is defined as the positive solution of the equation:
1
2
f (0) = f(κ). (2)
Note that Equation (2) admits exactly one positive solution. Indeed, f is continuous, strictly de-
creasing on R+ with f(0) > 0 and lim+∞ f(x) = 0 (because f is a decreasing probability density).
Parameter κ is the time it takes for f to decrease to half its modal value. It measures how ’flat’
the consumer distribution is.
Proposition 1 (No differentiation)
(i) A (pure strategy) equilibrium with no differentiation exists if and only if δ ≥ κ.
(ii) In this case, the unique equilibrium of the game is (0, 0): both firms converge at the me-
dian/modal position.
Proposition 2 (Partial differentiation)
(i) A (pure strategy) equilibrium with partial differentiation exists if and only if κ2 < δ < κ.
(ii) In this case, the unique equilibrium of the game is (δ − κ, κ− δ) (up to a permutation of the
players).
Proposition 3 (Full differentiation)
(i) A (pure strategy) equilibrium with full differentiation exists if and only if δ ≤ κ2 .
(ii) In this case, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium (−δ, δ). Besides, as soon as δ < 12κ, there
is also a continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria, where firms are located at distance exactly 2δ
one from the other.
More specifically, (up to a permutation of the players) the whole set of equilibria is (m− δ,m+ δ)
for m ∈ [−α, α], where α ∈ [0, δ] is uniquely defined by:
α := max{t ∈ [0, δ] : 1
2
f (t) ≤ f(t+ 2δ)}. (3)
The proof of these three propositions is provided in the Appendix (Section 5.1). Before we give
in the next section an economic intuition for these main results, note that parameters κ and α are
easy to derive from the distribution f of consumers, as illustrated in the following examples.
Example 4 (Normal distribution)
Suppose that consumers are distributed according to a normal distribution N (0, σ2), i.e. f(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
x2
2σ2 with σ > 0.
Then: κ = σ
√
2ln(2) and α = min
{
δ, σ
2ln(2)
2δ − δ
}
.
Example 5 (Laplace distribution)
Suppose that consumers are distributed according to a Laplace distribution L(0, β), i.e. f(x) =
1
2β e
− |x|
β with β > 0.
Then: κ = βln(2) and α = δ.
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4 Comments and discussion
In this section, we first comment upon our main results, and give the main economic intuition. We
then propose some efficiency considerations. Last, we discuss how our results should be adapted
in the case of a uniform distribution of consumers.
4.1 Comments
As explained in the introduction, we explain differentiation by a direct demand-driven effect, stem-
ming from the fact that there is a maximal distance consumers are ready to cover to buy the
good. To understand how this effect operates, consider again the powerful argument leading to
convergence in the case of a perfectly inelastic demand (δ = +∞). Suppose that the firms choose
different locations. Then each of them can unambiguously increase its profit by moving closer to
its competitor. Indeed, consider the firm initially located on the right hand side, say Firm 2. By
moving closer to its opponent (that is, moving to the left),
1. Firm 2 does not lose any consumers on its right-hand side (by assumption, these consumers
will still buy from Firm 2), and
2. Firm 2 attracts a larger quantity of consumers located between the two firms.
When we relax the assumption that consumers are ready to buy the good whatever the locations
of the firms, this latter argument is still active: There is still a force towards convergence, due to
the willingness to compete for the "central" consumers. But the former argument according to
which Firm 2 does not lose any consumers on its right-hand side is no longer valid. In that case, by
moving closer to its competitor, the firm may lose the "peripheral" consumers who were indifferent
between buying from Firm 2 and not buying the good. There are now two types of relevant marginal
consumers: those who are located between the two firms and could potentially buy from both, and
those who are located at the border of the domains of attraction and who are indifferent between
buying from the closest firms and not buying the good. Depending on how this trade-off is solved,
there can be no, partial or full differentiation at equilibrium.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 taken together show that the regime regarding the firm differentiation
depends on the ratio δκ . Interestingly, the characterization of the equilibria does not depend on the
details of the transport cost function. The only thing that matters is the maximal distance the
consumer is ready to cover to buy the good (δ) and the shape of the distribution of consumers, as
summarized by parameter κ, where κ is the time it takes for the density f to decrease to half its
initial value (see Equation (2)).
Case δκ ≥ 1: No differentiation. In that case, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, at which
both firms choose to locate at the median position. As noticed in the introduction, the intuition
suggests that firms will convergence at the center if the distance a consumer is ready to cover to
buy the good is large enough (δ large) or if consumers are sufficiently numerous around the center.
Proposition 1 provides a precise quantification for these conditions: The situation where both firms
converge is an equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ κ.
To understand the intuition behind this condition, assume that one firm, say firm 1, chooses the
modal median location (0). If its opponent also selects this central position, both firms will have
exactly the same potential attraction zones: A1(0, 0) = A2(0, 0) = [−δ, δ] , and each will attract one
half of the consumers who are located within acceptable distance of 0. Therefore, the payoff for firm
2 is q2(0, 0) =
F (δ)−F (−δ)
2 . Since f is assumed to be symmetric, note that q2(0, 0) = F (δ) − F (0).
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If firm 2 moves slightly to the right, say by some small ε > 0, its potential attraction zone will now
be A2(0, ε) = [δ − ε, δ + ε]. By doing so, it will attract all consumers located between ε2 and δ+ ε,
and q2(0, ε) = F (δ + ε) − F ( ε2). The move is beneficial if the mass of consumers located at δ is
larger than half the mass of the consumers located at 0. This condition is 12f(0) < f(δ), which is
exactly the condition δ < κ (remember that κ is the time it takes for the density f to decrease to
half its initial value). The assumptions about the logconcavity of f are sufficient to guarantee that
the examination of first order conditions are sufficient to characterize equilibrium. We also show
in the appendix that there is no equilibrium with convergence at another location than 0.
Consider Example 4. In the case of a normal distribution with variance σ2, the condition δ ≥ κ
can be written as δ ≥ σ×√2 ln(2). Note that√2 ln(2) is approximately equal to 1.18. This shows
that, for the no differentiation principle to hold, the total length of a firm’s potential attraction
zone (2δ) has to be approximately at least as large as 2.35 time the standard deviation of the
distribution of consumer locations. This figure is quite high. By instance, one may check that
when δ/σ =
√
2 ln(2), the potential attraction zone of a firm located at the center covers over 75%
of the population.
Case 12 <
δ
κ < 1: Partial differentiation. In that case, for each (δ, κ), there is a unique Nash
equilibrium, in which the two firms engage in “partial differentiation”. The unique equilibrium is
symmetric, with firms choosing locations (δ − κ, κ− δ), where 0 < κ−δ < δ. The distance between
the two firms is 2 (κ− δ) < 2δ: a positive mass of consumers, in particular the median consumer,
are located within acceptable distance of both firms. Note that the distance between the two firms
is decreasing in δ.
To understand the intuition behind this result, remember that, as discussed in the case of full
convergence, whenever the potential attraction zones of the two firms intersect on a set of positive
mass, a firm faces a trade-off. Indeed, by moving away from its opponent, it could attract new
"peripheral" consumers, who were not buying the good at the initial locations. But this move would
imply losing the "central" consumers who were initially indifferent between the two firms, a share
1/2 of which were buying from this firm in the initial situation. The equilibria described in that
case are characterized by the fact that these two effects exactly offset one another. Besides, one
can show (see Appendix) that only symmetric equilibria exist in that case: firms choose symmetric
locations, say (−x,+x), x ≥ 0. Consider the firm at location x. For this firm, the "peripheral"
consumers that it could attract by moving further to the right are those located around x + δ,
whereas the "central" consumers who are initially indifferent between the two firms are those
located around 0. The condition stating that the two opposite effects exactly counter-balance is
therefore 12f(0) = f(x + δ), which yields x = κ − δ. Note that this equilibrium only exists when
the resulting distance is strictly lower than 2δ, that is, when 2κ− 2δ < 2δ (12 < δκ).
When the ratio δκ is small enough so that this condition is no longer satisfied, we move to a
situation of full differentiation.
Case δκ ≤ 12 : Full differentiation. In that case, for each pair (δ, κ), there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium (−δ, δ); besides, as soon as δκ < 12 , there is also a continuum of asymmetric
Nash equilibria. In all these equilibria, the two firms are located at distance 2δ one from the other:
the potential attraction zones of the two firms do not intersect (more precisely, a mass zero of
consumers simultaneously belong to both potential attraction zones).
In the case of a normal distribution, the condition δ ≤ 12κ states that the domain of attraction
of a firm located at the center has to cover at most 45% of the population.
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4.2 Efficiency of equilibria
In this subsection, we compare equilibrium locations to these which would be optimal either from
the consumers’ point of view (consumer surplus maximizing locations) or from the firms’ perspective
(aggregate profit maximizing locations). Aggregate profit maximizing locations and consumer
surplus maximizing locations are described in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Efficiency)
(1) (Aggregate profit maximizing locations) Assume that both firsms have the same production
functions (γ1 = γ2). Then the location profile maximizing the sum of the firms’ profits is (−δ, δ),
which entails full differentiation.
(2) (Consumer surplus maximizing locations) The location profile maximizing consumer sur-
plus entails partial differentiation. The detail of the location profile maximizing consumer surplus
depends on the transportation cost function c(.).
The proof of Proposition 6 is provided in the appendix, section 5.2.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of Proposition 6 when consumers are distributed according to
a standard normal distribution. It plots the level of differentiation as a function of δ: (i) in the
Nash equilibria profile, (ii) in the aggregate profit maximizing profile, and (iii) in the consumers’
surplus maximizing profile. More precisely, on the vertical axis, it shows the ratio of the resulting
distance between the two firms to the minimal distance between the firms that guaranties full
differentiation (2δ). A ratio of 1 means full differentiation and a ratio of 0 means no differentiation.
As emphasized in Proposition 6, the profile of locations that maximizes consumer surplus depends
on the transportation cost function; it this example, we choose linear transportation costs c(d) = d.
As noted earlier (see Example 4), when consumers are distributed according to N (1), κ = √2 ln(2),
which is approximately equal to 1.18.
This figure illustrates that there exists a unique value of δ ∈]0,+∞[ such that the equilibrium
and the consumers surplus maximizing profile coincide. For smaller value of δ, the distance between
firms at equilibrium is strictly larger than it would be in a consumer surplus maximizing profile,
for larger value of δ, it is strictly smaller.
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4.3 Uniform distribution of consumers
So far, we have supposed that the distribution of consumers is symmetric around 0, log-concave
and strictly decreasing on R+. These assumptions are weak as this case includes most of standard
distributions (Normal, Laplace, Logistic, etc.). However, a large part of the literature on horizontal
differentiation has studied the particular case of consumers uniformly distributed on an interval.
In this subsection we discuss this case, which is not included in our general model as in the uniform
case, the function f is no longer strictly decreasing on R+.
We consider the case where consumers are distributed uniformly in the interval X = [−κ, κ],
for some κ > 0. We choose this notation to be consistent with our previous notation (see Definition
(2)). Indeed, consider the following alternative (more general) definition for κ:
κ = inf
{
t ∈ R+ : 1
2
f(0) > f(t)
}
.
It coincides with Definition (2) when f is continuous and strictly decreasing on R+, but can also
be used in the uniform case. We still assume that the firms can choose any location on the real
line R.
Proposition 7 shows that most of the results stated in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 extend to the
uniform case, the only adaption to be made being the characterization of equilibria with full
differentiation.
Proposition 7 (Uniform distribution)
Assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on [−κ, κ].
Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Part (i) of Proposition 3 extend to this uniform case.
The only difference lays with the characterization of equilibria with full diferentiation (Part (ii) of
Proposition 3): In the uniform case, if δ ≤ κ2 , there exists a continuum of equilibria where the two
firms locate at distance at least 2δ one from the other. More specifically, supposing without loss of
generality that x1 ≤ x2, the whole set of equilibria is (x1, x2) for −κ+δ ≤ x1 ≤ x1+2δ ≤ x2 ≤ κ−δ.
The proof of this proposition is provided in section 5.3 in the appendix. Proposition 5.3 shows
that in the case of a uniform distribution, the three regimes of no, partial, and full differentiation
still exist. The main difference is that now, in the case of full differentiation, the firms can locate
at a distance strictly larger than 2δ one from the other at equilibrium.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Proposition 3 (Characterization
of equilibria)
The proof of the propositions rely on the following lemmas.
Lemma 8
If the density f is symmetric around 0 and strictly decreasing on R+, then the cumulative function
F satisfies the following properties:
For any δ > 0,
(1) if x < 0, then F (x+ δ)− F (x) > F (x)− F (x− δ)
(2) if x > 0, then F (x+ δ)− F (x) < F (x)− F (x− δ).
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Proof. of Lemma 8
(1) Note that
F (x+ δ)− F (x) =
∫ t=x+δ
t=x
f(t)dt =
∫ t=−x
t=x
f(t)dt+
∫ t=x+δ
t=−x
f(t)dt
F (x)− F (x− δ) =
∫ t=x
t=x−δ
f(t)dt =
∫ t=−x−δ
t=x−δ
f(t)dt+
∫ t=x
t=−x−δ
f(t)dt
Assume x < 0.
Consider first the case x+ δ ≤ −x. Then for all t ∈ [x, x+ δ], f(t) ≥ f(x) with a strict inequality
if x < t < x + δ. Besides, for all t ∈ [x− δ, x], f(t) ≤ f(x) with a strict inequality if t < x. This
shows that in that case F (x+ δ)− F (x) > F (x)− F (x− δ).
Consider now the case x + δ ≥ −x. By symmetry of f , ∫ t=x+δt=−x f(t)dt = ∫ t=xt=−x−δ f(t)dt. For all
t ∈ [x− δ,−x− δ], f(t) < f(x). And for all t ∈ [x,−x], f(t) ≥ f(x) with a strict inequality if
x < t < −x. This shows that in that case too F (x+ δ)− F (x) > F (x)− F (x− δ).
(2) By symmetry, the proof is the same as for claim (1).
Lemma 9 provides a few useful remarks about the structure of equilibria and best responses.
Lemma 9
(1) x2 = 0 is the unique best response to any x1 such that |x1| ≥ 2δ.
(2) Any best response to x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0[ belongs to the interval ]x1, x1 + 2δ].
(3) Any best response to x1 ∈ ]0, 2δ] belongs to the interval [x1 − 2δ, x1[.
(4) Any best response to x1 = 0 belongs to the interval [−2δ, 2δ].
(5) Any equilibrium (x1, x2) such that x1 ≤ x2 satisfies x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0] and x2 ∈ [0, 2δ].
Proof. of Lemma 9
(1) If |x1| ≥ 2δ then q2(x1, 0) = F (δ)− F (−δ), which is the strictly maximal feasible payoff since
f is symmetric around 0 and strictly decreasing on R+.
(2) Let x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0[.
First note that because f is strictly decreasing on R+, if x2 > x1 +2δ, then q2(x1, x2) < q2(x1, x1 +
2δ), and if x2 < x1 − 2δ then q2(x1, x2) < q2(x1, x1 − 2δ). Therefore the best response belongs to
the interval [x1 − 2δ, x1 + 2δ].
But, because f is symmetric, if x2 ∈ [x1 − 2δ, x1[ then q2(x1, x2) < q2(x1,−x2), which shows that
the best response belongs to the interval [x1, x1 + 2δ].
It remains to show that x2 = x1 cannot be a best response against x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0[. Note that for
ε > 0 small enough,
q2(x1, x1) =
F (x1 + δ)− F (x1 − δ)
2
q2(x1, x1 + ε) = F (x1 + ε+ δ)− F (x1 + ε
2
)
Therefore
lim
ε→0
ε>0
q2(x1, x1 + ε)− q2(x1, x1) = F (x1 + δ) + F (x1 − δ)
2
− F (x1),
which by Lemma 8 is positive since by assumption x1 < 0. This concludes the proof of claim (2).
(3) By symmetry, the proof is the same as for claim (2).
(4) Let x1 = 0. If x2 > 2δ, then q2(0, x2) = F (x2 + δ)− F (x2 − δ), which is strictly decreasing in
x2 for x2 ∈ ]2δ,+∞[. Therefore, x2 > 2δ cannot be a best response against x1 = 0. By symmetry,
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x2 < −2δ cannot be a best response against x1 = 0.
(5) Let (x1, x2) be an equilibrium with x1 ≤ x2.
Suppose first that |x1| > 2δ. Then, x2 = 0 according to claim (1), and claim (4) contradicts the
fact that x1 is a best response to x2, so it must be the case that |x1| ≤ 2δ.
Suppose now that 0 < x1 ≤ 2δ. Then, by claim (3), x2 < x1. Since by assumption, x1 ≤ x2, it
implies a contradiction. Therefore x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0].
Similar arguments show that x2 ∈ [0, 2δ], which concludes the proof of claim (5).
According to Lemma 9, at any equilibrium (x1, x2) such that x1 ≤ x2, we have that x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0]
(claim (5)) and Player 2’s best response against x1 belongs to the interval ]x1, x1 + 2δ] (claim (2)).
Player 2’s payoff when it selects x2 in this interval is:
q2(x1, x2) = F (x2 + δ)− F
(
x2 + x1
2
)
,
and
∂q2
∂x2
(x1, x2) = f(x2 + δ)− 1
2
f
(
x2 + x1
2
)
. (4)
Note that when x2 = x1 + 2δ, we only compute a left derivative.
Remark 10 Before turning to the proofs of the propositions, let us introduce the function Ψz,
where for t, z ∈ R, Ψz is defined as follows:
Ψz(t) :=
f(t)
f(t+ z)
. (5)
Because of the log-concavity of f , we have that:
• For any z > 0, t 7−→ Ψz(t) is increasing in t ∈ R,
• For any z < 0, t 7−→ Ψz(t) is decreasing in t ∈ R.
Indeed, the log-concave function f can be written eg, where g is a concave function. Therefore
Ψ′z(t) = (g′(t)− g′(t+ z))eg(t)−g(t+z) has the same sign than g′(t)− g′(t+ z). The monotony of Ψz
follows from the fact that g′ is decreasing.
We are now ready to complete the proofs of propositions 1, 2 and 3.
Proof of Propostion 1
Assume that (x1, x2) is an equilibrium such that x1 = x2. Lemma 9 implies that x1 = x2 = 0.
Indeed, Claim (5) states that x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0], and Claim (2) states that any best response to x1 ∈
[−2δ, 0[ is strictly larger than x1. Therefore, there exists an equilibrium with no differentiation
if and only if (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium. In that case, it is the unique equilibrium with no
differentiation.
It remains to show (0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if κ ≤ δ. A necessary condition for
(0, 0) to be a Nash equilibrium is that
lim
x2→0
x2>0
∂q2
∂x2
(0, x2) ≤ 0,
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which given equation (4) can be written as f(δ) ≤ 12f(0). This is exactly condition κ ≤ δ. Although
the function x2 7→ g2(x1, x2) is in general discontinuous in x2 = x1, it is continuous in the particular
case where x1 = 0 (because f is symmetric), so that it’s enough to consider the derivative in x2 > 0,
x2 → 0.
Last, let us show that when condition κ ≤ δ holds, ∂q2∂x2 (0, x2) < 0 for all x2 ∈ ]0, 2δ], which will
guarantee that x2 = 0 is a best response againt x1 = 0. Given equation (4), for x2 ∈ ]0, 2δ]:
∂q2
∂x2
(0, x2) = f(x2 + δ)− 1
2
f(
x2
2
).
Note that when x2 = 2δ, we only compute a left derivative. We have:
f(x22 )
f(x2 + δ)
= Ψx2
2
+δ
(x2
2
)
≥ Ψx2
2
+δ (0) =
f(0)
f(x22 + δ)
>
f(0)
f(δ)
,
where the first inequality follows from the observation that x22 + δ > 0 and
x2
2 > 0, and the second
inequality follows from the fact that 0 < δ < x22 + δ and f is strictly decreasing on R
+. Since by
assumption f(δ) ≤ 12f(0), this proves that ∂q2∂x2 (0, x2) < 0 for all x2 ∈ ]0, 2δ],and x2 = 0 is a best
response againt x1 = 0.
The same argument shows that when f(δ) ≤ 12f(0), x1 = 0 is a best response againt x2 = 0.
Therefore, condition κ ≤ δ is a necessary and sufficient condition for (0, 0) to be a Nash
equilibrium. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that x1 leqx2 and that (x1, x2) is an equilibrium with
partial differentiation, meaning that 0 < x2 − x1 < 2δ.
According to Lemma 9, at any equilibrium (x1, x2) such that x1 ≤ x2, it must be the case that
x1 ∈ [−2δ, 0] ∩ [x2 − 2δ, x2[ and x2 ∈ [−2δ, 0] ∩ ]x1, x1 + 2δ]. Since x2 − 2δ < x1 < x2 < x1 + 2δ,
the first-order conditions imply that ∂q1∂x1 (x1, x2) =
∂q2
∂x2
(x1, x2) = 0, and therefore that:
f(x2 + δ) = f(x1 − δ),
which, when x2−x1 < 2δ, is possible only if x2 +x1 = 0: An equilibrium with partial differentiation
is necessarily symmetric.
Assume that (−x2, x2) is a symmetric equilibrium with x2 > 0. From equation (4), it must be
the case that
∂q2
∂x2
(−x2, x2) = 0⇔ f(x2 + δ) = 1
2
f (0) .
If (−x2, x2) is an equilibrium partial differentiation, it must be the case that x2 < δ. By definition
of κ (see (2)), equation f(x2 + δ) = 12f (0) has a solution in ]0, δ[ if and only if
κ
2 < δ < κ. In that
case, the solution is unique and is x2 = κ− δ.
Assume that κ2 < δ < κ. It remains to show (δ − κ, κ− δ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Let us first show that x2 = κ− δ is a best response against x1 = δ − κ. It is sufficient to prove
that:
∂q2
∂x2
(δ − κ, x2) > 0 if δ − κ < x2 < κ− δ
∂q2
∂x2
(δ − κ, x2) < 0 if κ− δ < x2 < 3δ − κ
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Given (4), for x2 ∈ ]δ − κ, 3δ − κ]:
∂q2
∂x2
(δ − κ, x2) = f(x2 + δ)− 1
2
f
(
δ − κ+ x2
2
)
.
Consider first the case δ − κ < x2 < κ− δ. Note that
f( δ−κ+x22 )
f (x2 + δ)
= Ψ δ+κ+x2
2
(
δ − κ+ x2
2
)
≤ Ψ δ+κ+x2
2
(0) =
f(0)
f( δ+κ+x22 )
<
f(0)
f(κ)
,
where the first inequality follows from the observation that δ+κ+x22 > 0 and
δ−κ+x2
2 < 0, and
the second inequality follows from the fact that 0 < δ+κ+x22 < κ and f is strictly decreasing on
R+. Since by assumption f(κ) = 12f(0), this proves that
∂q2
∂x2
(0, x2) > 0 for all x2 such that
δ − κ < x2 < κ− δ.
Consider now the case κ− δ < x2 < 3δ − κ. Note that
f( δ−κ+x22 )
f (x2 + δ)
= Ψ δ+κ+x2
2
(
δ − κ+ x2
2
)
≥ Ψ δ+κ+x2
2
(0) =
f(0)
f( δ+κ+x22 )
>
f(0)
f(κ)
,
where the first inequality follows from the observation that δ+κ+x22 > 0 and
δ−κ+x2
2 > 0, and
the second inequality follows from the fact that 0 < κ < δ+κ+x22 and f is strictly decreasing on
R+. Since by assumption f(κ) = 12f(0), this proves that
∂q2
∂x2
(0, x2) < 0 for all x2 such that
κ− δ < x2 < 3δ − κ.
This shows that x2 = κ− δ is a best response against x1 = δ − κ.
A symmetric argument shows that x1 = δ − κ is a best response against x2 = κ− δ
Proposition 2 is proved.
Proof of proposition 3. It follows from Lemma 9 that any equilibrium with full differen-
tiation is necessarily of the form (a − δ, a + δ) for some a ∈ [−δ, δ]. Besides, (a − δ, a + δ) is an
equilibrium only if:
lim
x1→a−δ
x1>a−δ
∂q1
∂x1
(x1, a+ δ) =
1
2
f (a)− f (a− 2δ) ≤ 0⇔ Ψ−2δ(a) ≤ 2,
lim
x2→a+δ
x2<a+δ
∂q2
∂x2
(a− δ, x2) = f (a+ 2δ)− 1
2
f (a) ≥ 0⇔ Ψ2δ(a) ≤ 2,
where Ψz(.) is defined by (5). Therefore, a necessary condition for (a−δ, a+δ) to be an equilibrium
is that max (Ψ−2δ(a),Ψ2δ(a)) ≤ 2.
Note that because of the logconcavity of f , t 7→ Ψ−2δ(t) is a decreasing function on R and
t 7→ Ψ2δ(t) is an increasing function on R. Besides, Ψ−2δ(0) = Ψ2δ(0). Therefore
max (Ψ−2δ(a),Ψ2δ(a)) =
{
Ψ2δ(a) if a ≥ 0
Ψ−2δ(a) if a ≤ 0
Since Ψ−2δ(a) = Ψ2δ(−a), then max (Ψ−2δ(a),Ψ2δ(a)) = Ψ2δ(|a|).
Note that there exists a ∈ [−δ, δ] such that Ψ2δ(|a|) ≤ 2 if and only if Ψ2δ(0) ≤ 2⇔ 2δ ≤ κ.
If this condition holds, α(f, δ) defined in 3 exists and is uniquely defined, and (−δ+ a,+δ+ a)
is an equilibrium only if a ∈ [−α(f, δ), α(f, δ)].
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Note that the case a = 0 is the unique symmetric equilibria in this class.
Assume that 2δ ≤ κ and consider x1 ∈ [−δ − α(f, δ),−δ + α(f, δ)]. Let us show that
∂q2
∂x2
(x1, x2) > 0 for all x2 ∈ ]x1, x1 + 2δ], which will guarantee that x2 = x1 + 2δ is a best re-
sponse againt x1. Given (4), for x2 ∈ ]x1, x1 + 2δ[:
∂q2
∂x2
(x1, x2) = f(x2 + δ)− 1
2
f(
x1 + x2
2
).12
Note that
f(x1+x22 )
f(x2 + δ)
= Ψ
δ+
x2−x1
2
(
x1 + x2
2
)
≤ Ψ
δ+
x2−x1
2
(x1 + δ) =
f(x1 + δ)
f(x1+x22 + 2δ)
<
f(x1 + δ)
f(x1 + δ + 2δ)
,
where the first inequality follows from the observation that δ + x2−x12 > 0 and
x1+x2
2 < x1 + δ,
the second inequality follows from the fact that 0 ≤ x1+x22 + 2δ < (x1 + δ) + 2δ and f is strictly
decreasing on R+.
Note also that
f(x1 + δ)
f(x1 + δ + 2δ)
= Ψ2δ (x1 + δ) ≤ Ψ2δ (α(f, δ)) = f(α(f, δ))
f(α(f, δ) + 2δ)
≤ 2
where the first inequality follows from the observation that 2δ > 0 and x1 + δ ≤ α(f, δ), and the
second inequality follows from the definition of α(f, δ) (see (3)).
This proves that ∂q2∂x2 (x1, x2) < 0 for all x2 ∈ ]x1, x1 + 2δ],and x2 = x1 + 2δ is a best response
againt x1.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 6 (Efficiency)
Claim (1): Consumers’ surplus.
Suppose that firms’ locations are x1 and x2. When x1 ≤ x2, the consumers’ surplus is:
CS(x1, x2)
: =

∫ x1+x2
2
x1−δ
(v − p− c(|x1 − t|))f(t)dt+
∫ x2+δ
x1+x2
2
(v − p− c(|x2 − t|))f(t)dt if |x2 − x1| ≤ 2δ,
∫ x1+δ
x1−δ
(v − p− c(|x1 − t|))f(t)dt+
∫ x2+δ
x2−δ
(v − p− c(|x2 − t|))f(t)dt if |x2 − x1| ≥ 2δ.
Because players are anonymous, we have CS(x1, x2) = CS(x2, x1). Therefore, the previous
expression also holds for x1 ≥ x2.
Note first that there exists a profile that maximizes the consumers’ surplus. Indeed, the surplus
is a continuous function and because f(x) goes to zero as |x| goes to +∞, we can restrict the
analysis of CS(x1, x2) on a compact subset of R× R.
Remark that a situation with full convergence cannot be optimum. Indeed, for any x, y ∈ R,
x 6= y, CS(x, y) > CS(x, x).
It remains to show that a situation where |x2−x1| ≥ 2δ cannot be an optimum. Straightforward
computations show that when firms’ locations are x1 and x2, with x1 ≤ x2 and |x2 − x1| ≥ 2δ,
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then:
lim
ε→0
ε>0
CS(x1 + ε, x2)− CS(x1, x2)
ε
=
∫ δ
0
c′(s) [f(x1 + s)− f(x1 − s)] ds,
lim
ε→0
ε>0
CS(x1, x2 − ε)− CS(x1, x2)
ε
=
∫ δ
0
c′(s) [f(x2 − s)− f(x2 + s)] ds.
Note that if x1 < 0, for any s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ δ, f(x1 + s) − f(x1 − s) > 0. Indeed, if
x1 + s ≤ 0, it is true since f is increasing on R−. And if x1 + s ≥ 0: f(x1 + s) − f(x1 − s) >
0 ⇔ x1 + s < |x1 − s| ⇔ x1 < 0. Therefore if x1 < 0, then f(x1 + s) − f(x1 − s) > 0 and
limε→0
ε>0
CS(x1+ε,x2)−CS(x1,x2)
ε > 0: the consumer surplus would increase if Firm 1 were to move
closer to Firm 2.
Consider now the case x1 ≥ 0. Since |x2 − x1| ≥ 2δ, it implies that x2 > 0. A similar
argument shows that if x2 > 0, for any s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ δ, f(x2 + s) − f(x2 − s) < 0 and
limε→0
ε>0
CS(x1,x2−ε)−CS(x1,x2)
ε > 0: the consumer surplus would increase if Firm 2 were to move
closer to Firm 1.
This completes the proof of part 1.
Claim (2): Aggregate profit.
Assume the following conditions hold: (i) γ1 = γ2 = γ; (ii) γ′′ ≥ 0; (iii) γ′(1) < p. For q ∈ [0, 1]
and α ∈ [0, 1], denote by Π(q, α) the aggregate profit when total production is q and Firm 1 realizes
a share α of the total production (the remaining share being produce by Firm 2):
Π(q, α) = pq − γ (αq)− γ ((1− α)q) .
Then
∂Π
∂q
(q, α) = p− αγ′ (αq)− (1− α)γ′ ((1− α)q) .
Since γ′(x) < p for all x ∈ [0, 1], ∂Π∂q (q, α) > 0: aggregate profit is increasing with the aggregate
output.
Note also that:
∂Π
∂α
(q, α) = −qγ′ (αq) + qγ′ ((1− α)q)
∂2Π
∂α2
(q, α) = −q2γ′′ (αq)− q2γ′′ ((1− α)q) ≤ 0,
therefore for all α ∈ [0, 1],
Π(q, α) ≤ Π
(
q,
1
2
)
,
which means that fixing the total output q, an equal sharing of the production is efficient (there is
no way to make costs strictly lower).
Since the profile of location (−δ,+δ) is the unique profile which maximizes total sales, and
since it is symmetric, it is the unique solution of the aggregate profit maximization program.
Which concludes the proof of Part 2.
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5.3 Proof of Proposition 7 (Uniform case).
Assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the [−κ, κ] interval. Firms can choose any
location on the real line.
The proof straightforwardly follows from the following five lemmas.
Lemma 11
If (x1, x2) is an equilibrium, then, necessarily, x1, x2 ∈ [−κ, κ] .
Proof. of Lemma 11
Note first that at equilibrium, both firms receive a positive payoff. Indeed, a firm could secure
a positive payoff by moving to the center 0. This remark proves that at equilibrium, x1, x2 ∈
]−κ− δ, κ+ δ[.
Assume that (x1, x2) is an equilibrium, with x1 ≤ x2.
Assume that −κ− δ ≤ x1 < −κ. If x1 = x2, Firm 2 could strictly increase its payoff by moving to
position −x1, which contradicts the fact that (x1, x2) is an equilibrium. If x1 < x2, Firm 1 could
strictly increase its payoff by moving slightly closer to Firm 2, which again contradicts the fact
that (x1, x2) is an equilibrium.
By symmetry, there can be no equilibria where κ < x2 ≤ κ+ δ.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 11.
Lemma 12
There exists an equilibrium where the firms locate at distance at least 2δ one from the other if and
only if δ ≤ κ2 . In that case, there exists a continuum of equilibria. More specifically, supposing
without loss of generality that x1 ≤ x2, the whole set of equilibria is (x1, x2) such that −κ + δ ≤
x1 ≤ x1 + 2δ ≤ x2 ≤ κ− δ.
Proof. of Lemma 12
By Lemma 11, one can restrict attention to (x1, x2) such that −κ ≤ x1 ≤ x1 + 2δ ≤ x2 ≤ κ. Note
that it must be the case that x2 ≤ κ − δ. Otherwise, Firm 2 could strictly increase its payoff by
moving slightly to the left. Similarly, it must be the case that x1 ≥ −κ+ δ. These two conditions,
together with the fact that x1 + 2δ ≤ x2 implies that 2δ ≤ κ.
Last, note that if 2δ ≤ κ, any (x1, x2) such that −κ + δ ≤ x1 ≤ x + 2δ ≤ x2 ≤ κ − δ gives both
firms the maximal possible payoff ( δκ), and is thus an equilibrium.
Lemma 13
There exists an equilibrium where the firms locate at distance less than 2δ one from the other without
converging if and only if 12 <
δ
κ < 1. If this condition holds, the unique equilibrium is (δ − κ, κ− δ)
(up to a permutation of the players).
Proof. of Lemma 13
By Lemma 11, one can restrict attention to (x1, x2) such that −κ ≤ x1 < x2 < x1 + 2δ and x2 ≤ κ.
In that case, q2 (x1, x2) = 12κ
[
min(κ, x2 + δ)− x1+x22
]
. The fact that firm 2 cannot increase its
payoff by deviating slightly to the left implies that x2 +δ ≥ κ. The fact that firm 2 cannot increase
its payoff by deviating slightly to the right implies that x2 + δ ≤ κ. It must therefore be the case
that x2 = κ− δ. Similarly, it must be the case that x1 = −κ+ δ. The distance between firm 1 and
2 has to be 2κ− 2δ. Since we have imposed that this distance should be positive and less than 2δ,
on gets the following necessary condition: 12 <
δ
κ < 1.
One may easily check that if this condition holds, (δ − κ, κ− δ) is an equilibrium.
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Lemma 14
(0, 0) is an equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ κ.
Proof. of Lemma 14
Let us first show that if δ ≥ κ, (0, 0) is an equilibrium. Assume that δ ≥ κ. Note that q1 (0, 0) =
q2 (0, 0) =
1
2 . And note that
q2 (0, x2) =
1
2κ
[
κ− x2
2
]
=
1
2
− x2
4κ
if x2 ≤ 2κ
= 0 otherwise.
This proves that ∀x2 > 0, q2 (0, x2) < q2 (0, 0). Therefore, (0, 0) is an equilibrium.
Let us now complete the proof by showing that is if δ < κ, (0, 0) is not an equilibrium. If δ < κ
q2 (0, 0) =
δ
2κ
and for 0 < ε < κ− δ,
q2 (0, ε) =
1
2κ
[
ε+ δ − ε
2
]
=
δ
2κ
+
ε
4κ
> q2 (0, 0) .
This completes the proof.
Lemma 15
There is no equilibrium where the firms choose the same location if this location is different from 0.
Proof. of Lemma 15
Assume that (x1, x2) is an equilibrium such that x1 = x2 = x > 0.
By Lemma 11, we know that necessarily, 0 < x ≤ κ.
Then:
q1 (x, x) =
1
2
× 1
2κ
[min (x+ δ, κ)−max (x− δ,−κ)]
and for ε > 0 small enough:
q1 (x− ε, x) = 1
2κ
[
x− ε
2
−max (x− ε− δ,−κ)
]
.
For (x, x) to be an equilibrium, it is therefore necessary that
x−max (x− δ,−κ) ≤ 1
2
× [min (x+ δ, κ)− x+ x−max (x− δ,−κ)] ,
which is equivalent to
x−max (x− δ,−κ) ≤ min (x+ δ, κ)− x
x+ min (−x+ δ, κ) ≤ min (x+ δ, κ)− x
min (δ, x+ κ) ≤ min (δ, κ− x)
If min (δ, x+ κ) = x+κ, this implies x+κ ≤ κ−x, which is impossible since by assumption x > 0.
Therefore min (δ, x+ κ) = δ and x ≤ κ− δ. Note that since x > 0, this implies that δ < κ.
If x ≤ κ− δ, then min (x+ δ, κ) = x+ δ and max (x− δ,−κ) = x− δ, therefore:
q1 (x, x) =
1
2
× δ
κ
.
19
But then note that
q1 (−x, x) = 1
2κ
[min (−x+ δ, 0)− (−x+ δ)]
=
1
2
× δ
κ
+
1
2κ
x+ min (−x+ δ, 0) .
Since x > 0, q1 (−x, x) > q1 (x, x) and (x, x) is not an equilibrium.
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